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Shuford: Newsman-Source Privilege: A Foundation in Policy for Recognition

NOTES
NEWSMAN-SOURCE PRIVILEGE: A FOUNDATION IN POLICY
FOR RECOGNITION AT COMMON LAW*
A popular government without popular information or the means of
acquiringit, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.'
A "censorship plague," 2 which threatens to deprive the nation's media of
vital news sources, has been precipitated by the ruling of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Caldwell.3 Newsmen are not engaging in
4
investigative reporting activities with the vigor of prior years. Reliable con6
2
fidential news sources are beginning to "clam up." The very survival of the
7
nation's fourth estate as an effective "watchdog" of government is threatened.
The Court ruled in Caldwell that the first amendment of the United States
Constitution does not provide newsmen with a privilege to refuse to disclose
confidential facts and sources to federal and state grand juries engaged in investigation of crime.8 Since June 29, 1972, the date of the 5-4 decision, more
than thirty-five newsmen have been cited for contempt for declining to reveal
sources to grand juries and other governmental bodies.9 Many other contempt
citations have gone unreported, 0 apparently because some reporters have
chosen to submit rather than resist and go to jail.
A few examples will suffice to reveal the gravity of the current conflict between the press and government over the sanctity of press sources and the reporters' work product. Peter Bridge, a reporter for the Newark News, was incarcerated for three weeks for refusing to give a New Jersey grand jury unpublished confidential information about attempted bribes of public officials."
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in his case.' 2 John Lawrence, Los Angeles
Times Washington bureau chief, was jailed by a federal district court judge
*EDrroR's

NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for

the best student note submitted in the fall 1973 quarter.
1. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, 1822, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337
(S. Padover ed. 1953).
2. Statement of Jack C. Landau and Fred P. Graham, Hearings on Newsmen's Privilege
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].

3. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
4. See 1973 Hearings,supra note 2,at 186-91.
5. "Confidentiality" is defined as a "promise or understanding that names or certain
aspects of communications will be kept off-the-record." United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S.
665, 728 (1972).
6.
7.
8.
9.

See 1973 Hearings,supra note 2,at 186-89, 755.
See id. at 45-52, 668.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 752-58.

10. See id. at 76.
11. In re Bridge, 120 NJ. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); 1973 Hearings, supra note 2,
at 753.
12. Bridge v. New Jersey, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
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for refusing to surrender confidential tapes of an interview with a principal in
the "Watergate" bugging.13 His contempt citation was upheld by the court of
appeals. 1 4 David Lightman, a Baltimore reporter, was held in contempt for
declining to reveal the source of a published story about drug abuse, and
faced imprisonment. 5 The Supreme Court refused to hear his case.' Finally,
William T. Farr, a Los Angeles Herald-Examiner reporter, refused to disclose
to the trial judge in the Manson-Tate murder case the source of a transcript
of a key witness's confession and was imprisoned for forty-six days. 17 Although
he was released from jail per order of Justice William 0. Douglas, Farr's petition for certiorari was ultimately denied by the Court. 8 In United States history no journalist has served a longer term than Farr for defying a court
order.' 9 The subpoenaing of newsmen by courts, grand juries, and legislative
and administrative bodies is expected to continue, and even more journalists
20
are likely to don the convict's stripes.
More serious than the imprisonment of newsmen is the threatened loss of
news sources and the resultant stiffing of the flow of vital information to the
public in such spheres as politics, government, dissident activity, and victimless crime. The chilling effect of the Caldwell case on news sources has been
noted in a number of incidents. A CBS news camera crew traveled in the
South in late 1972, gathering material for a documentary on the problems of
children in America. A woman, who said she could detail how she cheated on
welfare, agreed to an interview with the CBS crew on condition that her
identity not be revealed. CBS felt it could not make the commitment and the
filming was cancelled. 21 Following the subpoenaing of Earl Caldwell by a
California grand jury investigating the Black Panthers, ABC news was denied
an opportunity to conduct filmed interviews of the Panthers in their Oakland

13. In re Times Mirror Co., 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972); 1973 Hearings, supra note
2, at 753.
14. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 753.
15. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Special App.), aJ'd per curiam,
266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972); 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 753.
16. Lightman v. Maryland, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
17. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 9 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971); 1973
Hearings, supra note 2, at 752. It was suspected that one of the six attorneys involved in
the case supplied Farr with the transcript, contrary to a "gag rule" imposed by the court.
Farr was sued in 1973 by two of the suspected attorneys for alleged injury to their professional reputations. Damages sought amounted to S24 million. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times,
Nov. 3, 1973, §A at 4, col. I.
18. Farr v. Superior Court, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
19. Hearingson News Sources Begin This Month, 61 TnE QUILL, Feb. 1973, at 20.
20. "Until the Justice Department subpoenaed Earl Caldwell in 1970, there had been
occasional skirmishes between the press and the government over such sources, but a general
spirit of mutual accommodation had made subpoenas rare and thus kept the undecided
constitutional issue from coming to a head. Since Caldwell, the number of subpoenas for
reporters' testimony has increased sharply, and the practice of calling newsmen before official investigative bodies to learn their sources seems to have become something of a fad."
Brit Hume article in 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 616.
21. 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 755.
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headquarters because a firm promise of confidentiality could not be given. 22
After the Caldwell decision, the Louisville Courier-Journalcancelled a story
that detailed widespread use of marijuana among affluent adults in a Kentucky
community. 23 The paper sought to avoid a subpoena conflict with a local grand
jury. The Boston Globe was not able to pursue an investigation of official
corruption, following Caldwell, because of its inability to protect confidential
sources. 24 If the current trend persists and formerly bountiful news sources
continue to decline interviews, investigative reporting by the press will be
seriously impaired, and the media might become mere conduits for official
25
statements and press releases.
THE PRFss AND Tim GOVERNMENT IN CoNFLIcr

Dating from Johann Gutenberg's introduction of the printing press to
Europe in the 15th century, the history of press and government relations has
been one of conflict.2 6 The press has traditionally been feared and hated by
the "governing classes," as it constantly upset the status quo by stimulating
thought and arousing emotion in the governed.2 7 Challenging centralized
authority, the press was a frequent target for suppression in England. It fought
for survival in the face of licensing, stamp acts, sedition laws, and Star
28
Chamber proceedings.
In the American experience the battle between the journalist and the state
has been no less fierce. The first amendment has been characterized by historians as a concession offered the common man by wealthy conservatives to
gain popular support for the Constitution.2 The Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798, accountability of the press under the common law of libel, licensing of
the broadcast media, press access to government documents and proceedings,
and the right to publish in wartime are examples of issues over which the
media and government have differed in the United States.3 0 It is against this
background that the conflict over protection of confidential news sources and
information must be considered.
The Press'sCase
The press serves a vital role in the American governmental structure as a
"mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing
corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing
22. Id at 188, 755.
23. Id. at 612.
24. Id. at 755.
25. These fears were expressed by a substantial majority of the witnesses appearing
before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See id. at 1-405.
26. See E. EMERY,THE PRESS AND AMEucA 5-25 (2d ed. 1962).
27. See id. at 7-8.
28. Id. at 5-25.
29. Id. at 128-31.
80. See id. at 28-710. The Alien and Sedition Acts imposed statutory controls on the
publication of defamatory matter. Id. at 155.
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citizenry of public events and occurrences."' 31 In order to fulfill their civic
obligations, the media must have the freedom not only to publish 2 and disseminate 3 the news, but must be free to gather the news.3 4 Freedom from
restraint in the acquisition of information is the basic concern underlying the
current conflict between newsmen and the government over the protection of
confidential news sources and information. The ability to maintain confidentiality, the media urge, goes hand in hand with this right to gather news. 35
Journalists find basic support for their claimed right to protect confidential
sources in the first amendment, 36 source of the "public's right to know" and
the newsman's "responsibility" to report.37 Without constitutional protection
of confidential relationships, sources will be reluctant to divulge information,
38
and reporters will consequently be hindered in gathering information. Although the exercise of free press is not an absolute right, the Supreme Court
has held only a compelling interest will justify governmental infringement on
this "indispensable" liberty. 3 The media rely on Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigative Committee for the proposition that the government must show
a substantial relation between any information sought and a compelling interest to pursue an investigation into an area of protected press activity, "0 such as
the gathering of news. In addition to the first amendment, the journalist's
canons of ethics 41 and the editorial policies of employers are advanced in sup42
port of claimed confidentiality.

31. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
32. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
33. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
34. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (dictum).
35. "News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to
acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised." United
States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting opinion).
36. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
37. P. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 8-9, 162-63 (3d ed. 1966); 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 12.
38. As has already been stated, the Supreme Court has rejected the first amendment
arguments. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
39. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963) (dictum).
40. 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (dictum). In this case the president of the Miami branch of
the NAACP was subpoenaed to appear before and produce membership lists for the Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee (established to investigate the NAACP). He refused to
produce the organization's membership lists and was cited for contempt. The Supreme Court
overturned the contempt citations: "[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an
investigation which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech,
press, association and petition that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."
The Court said the committee had not shown "so cogent an interest in obtaining and making
public" the membership information sought to "justify the substantial abridgement of associational freedom which such disclosures will effect." Id.
41. Canon Five of the Code of Ethics of the American Newspaper Guild: "The newspaperman shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information
in court or before judicial or investigating bodies, and that the newspaperman's duty to
keep confidences shall include those he shared with one employer after he has changed
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The Government's Case
Competing with the interests of the media in an unfettered press is the
government's obligation to enact and enforce laws and the people's interest in
thorough and intensive investigation of societal problems and criminal conduct.43 Legislatures, courts, grand juries, and administrative bodies have important duties to perform under federal and state constitutions and law. Essential to the fulfillment of these duties is an ability to gather facts, 4 and
compulsory process aids governmental bodies in performing their factfinding
function by ensuring the appearance and testimony of witnesses. 45 Cooperation
with grand juries,46 legislative bodies, 4 7 and courts48 is looked upon as an obligation of citizenship, for the "public has a right to every man's evidence." 49
Aside from the government's interest, the court in In re Goodfader declared
that "a litigant, when resorting to the courts for redress of grievances or
determination of rights, is entitled to judicial aid in compelling the attendance
and the testimony of witnesses." 50 Similarly, one accused of criminal conduct
has an express constitutional right to compulsory process for witnesses. 51 The
media must face these compelling countervailing interests in their arguments

for a newsman-source privilege.
PricePaidfor Defiance
Newsmen are subject to citations for contempt of the legislature62 or the
employment." G. BinD, THE NEnvSPAPER AND SocEY 567 (1942). Courts have denied the
canon is a legal ground for recognition of the newsman-source privilege. E.g., Clein v. State,
52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914).
42. See Appendix B. This argument was rejected by the court in Phelps v. Fancher,
2 Hun 226 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1874).
43. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 327-31 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-82 (1919); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372-74 (1911).
44. See cases cited note 43 supra.
45. See cases cited note 43 supra.
46. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
47. "The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent .... It includes
surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling
the Congress to remedy them." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
48. "No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth
in a court of justice." 8 J. WIGhomE, EvMENCE §2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE]; see Cox v. Montague, 78 F. 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1897).
49. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
50. 45 Hawaii 317, 325, 367 P.2d 472, 478 (Hawaii 1961).
51. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI; FLA. CONsT. art. I, §16.
52. Either House of the United States Congress and any congressional committee can
compel attendance and testimony of witnesses. Refusal to appear or answer any question
constitutes a midsemeanor under federal law punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000
nor less than $100 and imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than twelve
months. 2 U.S.C. §192 (1970). State legislatures have similar authority. In Florida, for example, the state constitution grants the legislature and its committees power to subpoena as
well as to punish witnesses. Defiance of a subpoena or refusal to testify may lead to a $1,000
fine or up to 90 days in jail. FLA. CONST. art. 1II,

&5,
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court" for refusals to appear, testify, or reveal to governmental bodies confidential information and the names of sources. Contempt is usually defined
as a disregard or disobedience of the orders or commands of a public authority
or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language.54 Refusals to obey a subpoena to appear and testify constitute what
is commonly referred to as civil contempt.5 5 The court ordinarily punishes
civil contempt summarily, and the term of imprisonment may last as long as
the witness remains recalcitrant.56 Persons held in contempt of a grand jury
or legislature are normally imprisoned for the term of the investigation or
57
session.
In addition, newsmen face the possibility of a criminal charge if facts concerning felonious activity are concealed. The common law recognized a duty
to raise a "hue and cry" concerning felonies about which one had information,
and the crime of misprison could be charged for shirking this duty58 Misprison
is today embodied in the United States Code and many state statutes as a
criminal offense. 9
The Press in England
Were this the 17th century and English common law in control, a privilege
between newsmen and their sources would likely be recognized. "Honor
among gentlemen" was often advanced as sufficient reason for supporting a

privileged relationship. 0 If a pledge of confidentiality were given, the party
receiving the promise would be protected against compelled disclosure61 Ap53. Federal courts may fine or imprison in their discretion for contempt. 18 U.S.C. §401
(1970); 28 U.S.C. §1826 (1970). State judges also have the power to punish contempts. E.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 13, §5 (1958); FLA. STAT. §38.22 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§20-1201 to -1204
(1964). Grand juries seek the assistance of the courts to compel appearance and testimony.
28 U.S.C. §1826 (1970).
54. Richey v. McLeod, 137 Fla. 281, 285, 188 So. 228, 229 (1939). See Ex Parte Crews,
127 Fla. 381, 389, 173 So. 275, 279 (1937); Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 314-15, 95 So. 755,
760 (1923).
55. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
56. Id.; Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 313-15, 95 So. 755, 760 (1923).
57. E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); 28 U.S.C. §1826 (1970).
58. Sheriffs Act of 1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 55, §8(1); Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, c.
VI, at 114-15 (1285); Statute of Westminster the First, 3 Edw. I, c. IX, at 43 (1275).
59. "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same
to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States shall
be quilty of misprison and fined not more than .$500 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both." 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). Knowledge of the crime and some affirmative act of
concealment or participation is generally necessary for conviction under the federal statute.
United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 696 n.36 (1972). Most state statutes deal specifically
with the concealment of information about the commission or conspiracy to commit treason.
E.g., 5 ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-704 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §38 (West 1970); FLA.
STAT. §779.02 (1971); IOWA CODE ANN. §689.3 (1950); 17 ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. §3802 (1964).
60. Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 94, 77 Eng. Rep. 1369 (K.B. 1613)
(semble); Lord Grey's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 127 (1682); WIGMORE, supra note 48, §2286.
61. See authorities cited note 60, supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss3/3

6

Shuford: Newsman-Source Privilege: A Foundation in Policy for Recognition

1974]

NEWSMAN-SOURCE

PRIVILEGE

parently no cases specifically involving the press arose, however, prior to the
abandonment by English courts of the "honor among gentlemen" concept in
1776.02 When the issue of newsman-source privilege was first raised in England
in 1888, arguments presented in its support were rejected. 63 Later, however, a
privilege to protect news sources against disclosure in libel actions was fashioned by the English courts for the benefit of publishers.64 The privilege is
today discretionary when applied to reporters65 and apparently will not protect the newsman or publisher in criminal or administrative proceedings. 66

Early Cases in America
The "honor among gentlemen" concept, with a few exceptions, 67 was not
recognized in the United States. 68 Evidence indicates that a conflict between
the press and government on the newsman-source privilege issue accompanied
early press activity in America. 69 Yet, no reported cases appear until the latter
half of the 19th century. In 1857 James W. Simonton, a Washington correspondent, reported in the New York Daily Times that four congressmen had
taken bribes.70 Although summoned before a House committee, he refused to
reveal the names of confidential sources and was cited for contempt. 71 Then,
in 1887 a Georgia court ruled in a civil proceeding that a publisher had to
reveal the author of a libelous article7 2 Similarly, the California supreme court

held in 1897 that communications between reporters and criminal defendants
62. Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776) (bigamy trial conducted by
House of Lords). See also Hills Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 1362 (1777). "It should not be surprising that no testimonial privilege for newsmen developed at common law. The common law
perception of Freedom of the Press, as set down by Blackstone, contemplated the prosecutiofn
of newsmen for 'improper' or 'mischevious' [sic] publications." 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at
10. American conceptions of freedom of the press-absence of prior restraint, "taxes on
knowledge," sedition laws, et cetera-were not accepted in England until the 19th century.
E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMEmICA 1-25 (2d ed. 1962).
63. Parnell Commission's Proceedings, 52d day, Times' Reprint pt. 14, at 18 (1888).
64. Plymouth Mut. Cooperative &Indus. Soc'y v. Traders' Publishing Ass'n, [1906] 1 K.B.

403, 415-16 (CA.).
65. Lawson &Harrison v. Odhams Press Ltd., [1949] 1 K.B. 129 (C.A.).
66. D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 I-ARv. J. LECis. 307, 311 (1969).

67. See Mills v. Griswold, 1 Root 383 (Conn. 1792) (dictum) (confidences that are "necessary in the course of business" will be honored). The concept may be unofficially recognized in
some courtrooms. See 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 89-90.
68. See WIcasoRE, supra note 48.
69. "One of the pieces in our newspaper on some political point, which I have now
forgotten, gave offence to the Assembly. He was taken up, censur'd, and imprison'd for a
month by the speaker's warrant, I suppose, because he would not discover his author. I
too was taken up and examin'd before the council; but, tho' I did not give them any
satisfaction, they contentid themselves with admonishing me, and dismissed me, considering
me, perhaps, as an apprentice, who was bound to keep his master's secrets." THE AtrroBwoGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 26 (-Washington Square Press ed. 1969).
70. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 274-75, 411-12 (1857).
71. Id.
72. Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 SE. 320 (1887).
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were not protected.7 3 In the same year a newsman and editor were imprisoned
in California for contempt of the legislature following their refusal to reveal
the names of confidential sources, the court saying that a claim of privilege
74
could not be seriously advanced.
The press and government continued to do battle over this issue throughout the 20th century.7 5 Although claims of privilege were rather uniformly rejected by the courts, 76 an optimistic press felt a privilege was conferred by the
first amendment and would ultimately be recognized when the Supreme Court
77
chose to hear an appeal of a contempt citation.
The Caldwell Decision
Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, covered extensively the
activities of the Black Panther Party in California. , s He was subpoenaed in
1970 to testify before a federal grand jury investigating the organization for
possible violations of federal law.7 9 Caldwell moved to quash the subpoena or
alternatively to limit its scope so as to protect sources, alleging that disclosure
of his sources would impair his ability to gather news.8 0 Although the district
court granted a restrictive injunction prohibiting questions about sources,""
it refused to excuse Caldwell from testifying.8 2 Caldwell, convinced he should
not be compelled to attend, decided not to comply with the court order and
was cited for contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the
contempt citation and granted a qualified privilege to protect confidential
sources.8 3 The court, relying on the first amendment, said that a newsman
could be forced neither to reveal sources nor to submit to a grand jury interrogation absent showing of a compelling need for the information sufficient to override the claimed invasion of free press interests. 8 4 Newsmen were

73. People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 220, 48 P. 75, 86 (1897).
74. Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897).
75. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Joslyn v. People, 67
Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re
Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
76. E.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); Brewster v. Boston HeraldTraveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Ex
parte Holliway, 272 Mo. 108, 199 S.W. 412 (1917); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011
(Sup. Ct. 1913); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968).
77. Senator Alan Cranston of California testified in Senate hearings: "Most of the reporters, broadcasters, publishers, and private citizens with whom I have talked had generally assumed prior to the Caldwell decision that such a constitutional protection was
implicit in the first amendment freedom of the press clause." 1973 Hearings, supra note 2,
at 48.
78. 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 85-87.
79. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 675-79 (1972).
80. Id.
81. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
82. Id.
83. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
84. Id. at 1089.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss3/3

8

Shuford: Newsman-Source Privilege: A Foundation in Policy for Recognition
1974]

NEWSMAN-SOURCE

PRIVILEGE

understandably jubilant about the Ninth Circuit's decision, but few felt the
issue was permanently decided.85
The United States sought an appeal, and its petition for certiorari was
granted, 8 finally bringing the newsman-source privilege issue before the Supreme Court. In reversing the Ninth Circuit decision, the Court found no
first amendment privilege, qualified or unqualified, to refuse to appear or
answer the relevant and material questions asked during a good faith grand
jury investigation.8s "On the records now before us," Mr. Justice White wrote
for the Court, "we perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law
enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering, which is
said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to
relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation
or criminal trial."' 's
The Supreme Court indicated, however, that under some circumstances refusal to appear or reveal confidential information or sources could be justified
under the first amendment: (1) when a subpoena is issued to harass the newsman, (2) when a grand jury investigation is not held in good faith, (3) when
the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or (4) when the newsman's testimony would implicate confidential source relationships without a
legitimate need of law enforcement.8 9 The reporter's remedy under such circumstances would be a motion to quash the subpoena or a motion for a protective order. 0 Apparently because these limitations on the general obligation
to appear and testify were presented as dicta and embodied primarily in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell,91 they have been of little assistance
to the journalist called to testify in a criminal proceeding.92
85. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MicH. L. REv. 229,
283-84 1971).
86. United States v. Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
87. United States v. Caldwell 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Caldwell case was considered
along with two companion cases, Branzburg v. Hayes and In re Pappas. Paul M. Branzburg,
a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal,described in a news story the procedure for
synthesizing hashish from marijuana, a process he observed first hand. In another unrelated
article he detailed his observations of use and sale of drugs in Frankfort, Kentucky. On two
occasions he was subpoenaed by grand juries. He refused to reveal confidential sources in
testimony before one grand jury and went to court to prevent his appearance before the
other. The Kentucky courts declined to recognize Branzburg's confidential relationship with
his sources.
Newsman Paul Pappas refused to appear before and give testimony to a Massachusetts
grand jury concerning his observations and information received by him in a Black Panther
headquarters during a civil disorder in New Bedford. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to recognize any constitutional privilege. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266
N.E.2d 297 (1971).
88. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972).
89. Id. at 707-08, 709-10 (concurring opinion).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92, See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.
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Nevertheless, the ruling of the Court in Caldwell appears to be limited to
the facts and circumstances of the particular cases involved - testimony before
grand juries or courts about criminal conduct. 93 The power of civil courts,
legislatures, and administrative bodies to subpoena newsmen and compel testimony about confidential sources and information still seems to be in question.
Several courts have refused to extend the decision beyond the area of criminal
law.94 In the 1972 case of Cervantes v. Time, Inc. the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that in a civil libel action, where libelous materials were published in good faith, without actual malice and on the basis of careful efforts
at verification, the court would not compel revelation of news sources.95 The
court cited Caldwell, but noted that the Supreme Court did not consider
whether a civil suit should command a "different reconciliation of conflicting
interests" than that reached by the court in a criminal action.96 Similarly, in
a "Watergate" related suit brought by the Democratic National Committee,
97
another federal court granted newsmen a qualified privilege in civil actions.
The court said the cloak of secrecy shrouding the newsman and his sources
would not be removed absent a showing that the information sought is material to the case and that the movant has exhausted alternate sources. 98
While these two cases grant newsmen a qualified privilege in civil cases by
requiring the government to make a case of materiality or compelling need
prior to disclosure, their validity has not yet been determined by a ruling of
the Supreme Court or other federal and state courts, hence they accord the
newsman and his source little protection in most jurisdictions.
STATUTORY SOLUTIONS

The first newsman-source privilege statute, or "shield law," was enacted in
Maryland in 1896.19 Although the Maryland statute was assailed by some
scholars as "detestable in substance [and] in form,"' 09 sixteen other states
followed suit, adopting a variety of absolute and qualified privilege statutes.
The Maryland statute protects confidential news sources, but does not protect
confidential information received from a source.' 0 ' A qualified privilege is
conferred, the law requiring that the information be published for the priv-

93. 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 19-24; Comment, Newsman's Privilege: The First
Amendment Grants None, 25 U. FLA. L. REv.381, 87 (1973).
94. E.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1894 (D.D.C. 1973).
95. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
96. Id. at 992-93 n.9.
97. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
98. Id. at 1398.

99. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §2 (1971).
100. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2286 n.7 (2d ed. 1923).
101. MD. ANN. CODE art 35, §2 (1971); see State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18
(1967).
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ilege to attach to the relationship. 102 The statutes of fourteen other states, like

that of Maryland, protect solely the identity of news sources,103 while only
Michigan, New Mexico, and New York additionally shield confidential information received from a source. 10 4 Qualifications of one form or another are
contained in nine of the statutes,"05 while eight have been phrased in absolute
or unqualified terms. 06
Although a majority of the states have strictly construed these statutes, they
being in derogation of the common law,'0 7 some liberality has been shown in
at least one jurisdiction. In 1963 the Pennsylvania supreme court reversed
contempt citations against officials of a newspaper, concluding the state newsman's privilege statute was to be "liberally and broadly construed" to carry
out the objective and intent of the legislature. 0 s Although the statute was
phrased to shield sources, the court ruled documents and other "inanimate
objects" also protected.10 9 The court said the legislature had determined that
the "gathering and the protection of the source of news" is of "greater importance to the public interest and of more value to the public welfare than
0
the disclosure of the alleged crime or the alleged criminal.""1
Nine states that had previously failed to protect journalists' sources reacted
in 1972-1973 to the Caldwell case and subsequent arrests of journalists by

102. MD.

(1967).
103. ALA.

ANN. CODE
CODE

art. 35, §2 (1971); see State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18

tit. 7, §370 (1958); ALsKA

STAT.

§09.25.150 (Supp. 1970); Axuz. REv.

STAT. ANN. §12-2237 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE §1070
(West Supp. 1973); [1971] IIl. Pub. Act 77-1623; IND. AN. STAT. §2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §421.100 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451-54 (Cum. Supp. 1970); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §93-701.04 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. §49.275
(1971); N.J. REv. STAT.
§2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); Otuo REv. CODE ANN. §§2739.04-.12 (Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT.

tit. 28, §330 (Supp. 1970).
104. Micir. Coapt. LAws ANN. §767.5a (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §79h (McKinney Supp. 1970).
105. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §370 (1958); ALASKA STAT. §09.25.150 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE §1070 (West Supp. 1973); [1971] IIl. Pub. Act 77-1623;
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §421.100 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451-54 (Cum. Supp. 1970);
N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1969). The

privileges granted are "qualified" because on a showing of nonpublication, exhaustion of
alternative sources, or compelling need the protection of the law will not be accorded the
confidential relationship.
106. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §12-2237 (Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1733 (1968); MIcH.
CoAfp. LAws ANN. §767.5a (1968); MoNT.REV. CODES ANN. §93-701.04 (1964); NEV. Rzv. STAT.
§49.275 (1971); N.Y. Civ. RiGHTS LAw §79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§22739.04-.12 (Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. tit. 28, §330 (Supp. 1970).

107. E.g., Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Brogan v.
Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30
A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
108. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963).
109. Id.

110. Id. at 42; 193 A.2d at 185-86.
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considering privilege legislation.""' All proposals, however, were either defeated by the legislatures or were never submitted to a vote." 2
PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIPS

Few relationships between men are of sufficient importance to warrant
promotion by legal agencies charged with factfinding responsibilities. Generally, every citizen is obliged to appear before grand juries, courts, and
legislative and administrative bodies to give testimony about events for which
he has personal knowledge."' Nevertheless, society has determined that certain
relationships, due to their extraordinary nature, should be judiciously promoted by protecting the confidential communications that are the product of
the relationships: that of attorney and client, husband and wife, physician and
patient, and priest and penitent. As prerequisites to the granting of a testimonial privilege, four fundamental conditions, according to Dean Wigmore,
must be met: (1) the communications must originate in confidence, (2) confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relationship, (3) the relation must be one that in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered, and (4) the injury that would inure
to the relation by disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct resolution of a problem or issue." 4 These
four conditions serve "as the foundation of policy" for determining whether
a privilege should be granted"15 and have been utilized, with varying degrees
of emphasis, by courts in the United States, 1 6 Ireland,"17 and Canada. 118
Attorney-Client
The oldest of privileged relationships, that existing between attorney and
client, dates from the reign of Elizabeth I." 9 It was treated as a "natural" ex-

111. Fla. H.R. 3794 (2d Reg. Sess. 1972); Iowa H.R. 1118 (2d Reg. Sess. 1972); Mass.
S. 114 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Minn. S. 945 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Minn. H.R. 1728 (Reg. Sess. 1972);
Mo. H.R. 18 (Reg. Sess. 1971); Neb. Leg. 1179, 1371 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Tex. H.R. 205 (Reg.
Sess. 1972); Tex. S. 558 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Wis. S. 585 (Reg. Sess. 1971). A bill was drafted in
Idaho in 1972 but was never introduced. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 748.

112. 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 748.
113. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
114. WIGMORE, supra note 48, §2285.
115. Id.
116. E.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 740 n.10 (5th Cir. 1953); United States
v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967, 969 (E.D. Ky. 1949); O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire Ins. Co., 159
Mich. 187, 192-93, 123 N.W. 795, 797 (1909); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 503,
75 N.W.2d 762, 767 (1956); Marceau v. Orange Realty, Inc., 97 N.H. 497, 498-99, 92 A.2d
656, 657-58 (1952); State v. Smyth, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 168, 169 P.2d 706, 710-11 (1946).
117. Cook v. Carroll, [1945] Ir. R. 515.
118. In re Kryschuk, 14 D.L.R. 2d 676 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958); Rex v. Prentice, 20 D.L.R.
791 (Alta. S.C. 1914).
119. E.g., Kelway v. Kelway, Cary 89, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1580) (lawyer cannot be
compelled to give testimony touching on any "matter he knoweth as solicitor only"); Berd
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ception to the then novel right of parties in litigation to compel testimony. 120
Originally based on the "point of honor" concept, the first duty of an attorney
1 21
was said to be to "keep the secrets of his clients."
As earlier noted, the courts of England subsequently discarded the "point
of honor" concept, no longer attaching any moral delinquency or public
odium to the breaking of a pledge.' 22 Nevertheless, the attorney-client privilege
was retained, the courts determining that the "necessity of providing sub-

jectively for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser" was sufficient basis on which to grant a privilege.123
This privilege is well recognized in case 124 and statutory1 25 law, its foundation in policy having been established. Although some argue that the injury
to the relationship from compelled disclosure does not outweigh the injury
to the public from the unavailability of evidence,126 few would deny that the
communication arises in confidence, that confidentiality is essential to the relationship, and that the relation is one which the community feels should be
sedulously fostered.127 The attorney-client relationship is by necessity one of
confidence, which is promised to encourage full disclosure by the client, 12 8 for
the attorney can assist the client effectively only if he has obtained through
consultation the entire story. 2 9 Confidentiality is essential to the relationship
because in its absence the client would not "trust an attorney with the state of
his affairs."' 30 Few persons could safely seek expert counsel' 3' and reliance
upon individual legal resources would be encouraged.32 The courts and
legislatures have determined that the attorney-client relationship should be
nurtured, that justice will be achieved only if litigants can enlist the aid of
men skilled in jurisprudence.13 The community, by supporting this privilege,

v. Lovelace, Cary 62, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577) (the court held that a solicitor served with
process could not be compelled to testify).
120. WIGMOMR, supra note 48, §2290: "[]estimonial compulsion [compelling one to give
evidence on threat of contempt] does not appear to have been generally authorized until
the early part of Elizabeth's reign."
121. Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing, N.C. 235, 249, 132 Eng. Rep. 401,406 (C.P. 1836).
122. WIGMORE, supra note 48, §2290.
123. Id.
124. E.g., Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 US.
311 (1884); Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521, 152 A. 882 (1931); Lee v. Patten, 34 Fla. 149, 15
So. 775 (1894); Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 P. 537 (1909); Hatton v. Robinson, 31
Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833); Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 32 A. 975 (1895); Greenough v.
Gaskell, I Myl. & K. 98, 103-04, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620-21 (Ch. 1833).
125. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, §438 (1958); AMz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-1802 (1956); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, §321 (1958); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. §19-24 (1967); TEX. CoDE CalM. P. §38.10

(Supp. 1974).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

WIGMOR., supra note 48, §2291.
Id. §§2285, 2291.
Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895).
Id.
Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1140, 1225, 1241 (Ex. 1743).
Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl. &K. 98, 103-04, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620-21 (Ch. 1833).
Id.
See notes 124-125 supra.
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has recognized that the use of attorneys ensures "orderly, accurate, and equitable determination and adjustment of legal rights and duties."'31 4 And finally,
since the relationship promotes equality among litigants, enables judicious
utilization of court time, and promotes settlements, the conclusion is easily
reached that the attorney-client privilege should be protected even at the expense of lost evidence. 135
Husband-Wife
The husband-wife privilege was the second of the privileges to be enforced
at common law.136 Aimed at promoting family harmony and peace, 3 7 this
privilege is today widely recognized in England and the United States. 3
The privilege protects confidential communications between husband and
39
wife, which neither spouse can be compelled to disclose.
Policy supports the recognition of this privilege, the four conditions
necessary for its establishment having been met. The communications arise in
confidence, a fact that is ordinarily implied.14 0 Privacy is essential to the relationship, for it preserves "mutual confidence and unquestioning trust."''*
Also, the marital relationship, "most sacred of all domestic relations,"'142 is one
society has properly chosen to encourage. 43 Lastly, the loss of evidence by the
government and private litigants is deemed to be less significant than the
injury the institution of marriage would suffer from compelled disclosure.'4
Physician-Patient
With the abolition of the "point of honor" concept, 145 confidences given
by a patient to his physician lost the protection of the common law. The

134. Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895).
135. WGMtORE, supra note 48, §2291.
136. Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 555, 628 (1684). Although the husband-wife privilege was early recognized, an explicit statement of its existence did not come in England
until the statutory reforms of the Common Law Procedure Act in the 19th century. WicMiORE, supra note 48, §2333.
137. WIGMoRE, supra note 48, §2332.
138. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (dictum); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 209, 221-23 (1839); Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 429 (1885); People v. Mullings, 83
Cal. 138, 140, 23 P. 229, 230 (1890); Williams v. Betts, 11 Del. Ch. 128, 98 A. 371, 373 (Ch.
1916); Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 1954); Gross v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 176, 135
S.W. 373, 376 (1911); Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 274, 42 N.W. 218, 219 (1889); Reg. v.
Pamenter, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 177 (1872).
139. Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 226, 24 So. 154, 157 (1898); accord, Brown v. May, 76
So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
140. WiGMORE, supra note 48, §2332.
141. State ex rel. Barker v. McAuley, 51 Tenn. 424, 433 (1871).
142. Id.
143. WIGMORE, supra note 48, §2332.
144. Id.
145. Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573 (1776).
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physician-patient privilege has not again been recognized in England.1 8 Although American courts have generally followed the common law and denied
the privilege to this relationship,1 47 two-thirds of the state legislatures have
provided physician-patient communications with a shield from forced dis48
closure.
The conformity of this privilege with the four prerequisites of the Wigmore test, however, is subject to dispute. Although a patient seldom expressly
requests confidentiality when seeking treatment, 4 9 he readily assumes his
private health matters will not be revealed to individuals outside the medical
profession.1 50 Confidentiality is not, of course, essential in every case to the
maintenance of the physician-client relationship,1 51 but doctors occasionally
do deal with medical subjects - abortion, rape, venereal disease - where confidentiality is of vital importance to the patient.252 Threatened disclosure of
such secrets might disuade him from seeking medical assistance.18 3 Additionally, it is quite clear that the relation of physician-patient should be pro54

moted.
The greatest disagreement among authorities is noted in connection with
the final prerequisite. Dean Wigmore has stated emphatically that the "practical employment of the privilege has come to mean little but the suppression
of useful truth"- it being invoked in actions where there is little reason to
conceal the facts.-r- Others contend, however, that proper medical diagnosis
and the prevention of disease are of greater value than the potential loss of
evidence. 56 Apparently because it is unsettled whether policy supports this

146. E.g., Rex v. Gibbons, 1 Car. & P. 97, 171 Eng. Rep. 1117 (Assizes, 1823); Falmouth
v. Moss, 11 Price 455, 470, 147 Eng. Rep. 530, 535 (Ex. 1822); Wilson v. RastalI, 4 Term R.
753, 760, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1287 (K.B. 1792).
147. E.g., Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 25 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 638 (1928); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322, 324 (SD. Ga. 1957); Sherman v.
Sherman, 1 Root 486 (Conn. 1793); Hollenbacker v. Bryant, 42 Del. 242, 244, 30 A.2d 561,
562 (1943); Morrison v. Malmquist, 62 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1953); Boyd v. Wynn, 286 Ky. 173,
178, 150 S.W.2d 648, 650 (1941); New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 300, 31
N.E.2d 31, 32 (1940) (dictum); Crow v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 149, 160, 230 S.W. 148, 154
(1921).
148. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-2235 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §28-607 (1947); CAL.
Evm. CODE §1010-28 (1968); COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. §154-1-7(5) (1963); FLA. STAT. §90.242
(1971); IDAHO CODE §9-203(4) (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1714 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN.
§622.10 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-427 (1964); MicH. COMP. LAw ANN. §600.2157
(1968); NEB. REv. STAT. §49.215-45 (1971); WASH. Rxv. CODE §5.60.060(4) (Supp. 1972).
149. WIGMORE, supranote 48, §2380a.
150. See Cole v. Wolfskill, 49 Cal. App. 52, 54, 192 P. 549, 551 (2d Dist. 1920); Ulbrand
v. Bennett, 83 Ore. 557, 564-65, 163 P. 445, 447 (1917).
VfiGmoEE, supra note 48, §2380a.
151.
152. Id.; Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194-95 (1871).
153. Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1871).
154. WiMOaa, supra note 48, §2380a.
155. Id.
156. See Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185 (1871). State legislatures have
determined that the relationship is one to be enhanced even at the expense of factfinding.
See note 148 supra.
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privilege, courts have denied it recognition. 157 Yet, as has already been noted,
the legislatures of a large majority of the states have reconciled the policy disagreement in favor of the privilege.
Priest-Penitent
It has not been definitely determined whether a priest-penitent privilege
was established at common law before the Reformation. 158 If the respect of
pre-Reformation courts for the Church extended that far, the early view was
later overlooked or brushed aside, 159 and English courts have generally refused to recognize any such privilege for sacramental confessions. 6 0 Nor has
the privilege been accepted as a rule of common law in the United States.' 1'
It has, however, been sanctioned by legislation in more than two-thirds of the
states.' 62 Traditionally, these statutes were strictly construed to cover formal
"confessions of sin"; more recently they have been extended to all communications received by clergymen in general in the course of performance of
6
ministerial duties.' '
The priest-penitent privilege has "adequate grounds for recognition."164
The communications arise in confidence, an essential element of any confessional system. 65 As the confession is vital to the exercise of some faiths, such
as Roman Catholicism, society has determined the priest-penitent relation is
one to be protected. 66 The free exercise of religion clause in the first amendment would seem to compel recognition of this privilege.167 Lastly, because
157. See notes 146-147 supra.
158. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 278 (1958); Cook v. Carroll, [1945] Ir. R.
515, 517-19 (High Ct.).
159. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 278 (1958); Cook v. Carroll, [1945] Ir. R. 515,
517-19 (High Ct.).
160. E.g., Broad v. Pitt, 3 Car. & P. 518, 519, 172 Eng. Rep. 528-29 (C.P. 1828); Wilson
v. Rastall, 4 Term R. 753, 759-60, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1287 (K.B. 1792); Du Barre v. Livette,
Peake N.P. 108, 109-10, 170 Eng. Rep. 96, 97 (K.B. 1791); Anonymus, Skin. 404, 90 Eng. Rep.
179-80 (K.B. 1693).
161. E.g., State v. Morehous, 97 N.J.L. 285, 295, 117 A. 296, 300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922);
Trial of Christian Smith, I Am. St. Tr. 779, 784 (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817). Note, however, that there may be support for an argument that federal law recognizes the priestpenitent privilege. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (dictum); Mullen v.
United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1959); McMann v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n,
87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937) (dictum).
162. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §12-2233 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §28-606 (1947); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §154-1-7(4) (1963); FLA. STAT. §90.241 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. §9-203(3)
(1948); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1714 (1968); IOWA CODE §622.10 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-429
(1964); Ky. REV. STAT. §421.210(4) (1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §13 (1957); MICH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. §600.2156 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1607 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE
§5.60.060(3) (Supp. 1972).
163. WIGMOE, supra note 48, §2395.
164. Id. §2396.
165. Id.
166. See 4 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 588-91 (1827).
167. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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religious activity and faith are promoted through this open relationship, it
must be concluded that the advantage to justice gained by disclosure would
be minimal when considered in the light of possible extensive and irremediable injury to freedom of religion. 10s

A Policy Analysis - Journalist-SourceRelationship
Because there exists a "long-standing" presumption against the creation of
common law testimonial privileges, 169 American judges have not been disposed

to recognize a privilege for the journalist and his news source. 170 It is asserted
that the four Wigmore criteria do not necessitate such a privilege, that the
communications do not originate in confidence, that confidentiality is not
essential to the relationship, that society does not support the privilege, and
that the benefit to government from uninhibited access to information outweighs the injury to the press and its sources. 71 A careful analysis of this issue
indicates, however, that the foundation in policy for a journalist-source privilege may be just as strong as that for the well-established privileges.
The journalist often relies on confidential news sources. Vince Blasi, associate professor of law at the University of Michigan, has concluded from
975 responses he received in a nationwide survey of newsmen that "regular"
confidential sources are relied on in 22.2 per cent of the average reporter's
stories, while "first time" confidential informants are used in 12.2 per cent of
such stories. 7 2 A survey of Florida journalists revealed that while 13 per cent
of those responding had not used confidential sources, 40 per cent had relied
on them on "several" occasions and 33 per cent "frequently" use themY73 In
fact, many front page stories have broken because newsmen promised to protect their sources. Neil Sheehan of the New York Times relied on confidential
informants to bring the Pentagon Papers to the attention of the public.74 The
Associated Press's Jean Heller used undisclosed sources to uncover the scandalous Tuskegee syphilis experiments.175 Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward
of the Washington Post based their Pulitzer Prize winning stories about the

168. See 4 J. BENTHAM, supra note 166.
169. United States v. Bryan, 399 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950).
170. E.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); Brewster v. Boston HeraldTraveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E.
781 (1911); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
171. See WVIGMORE, supra note 48, §2286; 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 148.
172. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. Rxv. 229, 246-47
(1971). Professor Blasi, recognizing that newsmen who favor a journalist-source privilege are
more apt to purport to rely on them, stated in his article that the "extent of reliance on
confidential sources cannot be quantified with any degree of precision." Id.
173. Thirty-two general circulation newspapers in Florida were sent questionnaires, and
journalists were requested to respond to thirteen questions concerning the newsman-source
privilege issue. Responses were received from fifteen newsmen during the summer of 1973.
See Appendix B.
174. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 18.
175. Id.
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"Watergate" burglary and coverup on reports from secret government and
private sources. 176 Moreover, CBS correspondent Walter Cronkite stated in an
affidavit in the Caldwell case that he depended constantly on information,
ideas, leads, and opinions received in confidence and that they were essential
in digging out newsworthy facts and analyzing the significance of public
77
eventsy.
Confidential news sources are relied upon by newsmen for a number of
purposes: for "not-for-attribution" quotes, to verify information received from
others, in assessing news developments, as leads to other news sources, and to
prod information from attributable sources. 7 8 A promise by the journalist of
confidentiality is essential to the maintenance of these vital contacts. In the
absence of a newsman-source privilege or a promise by the journalist to go to
jail rather than disclose a source, an informant is deterred by fear from releasing information - fear that his employer will discharge him, fear that he
might be prosecuted as an accessory to a crime or for the crime itself, fear of
bodily injury to himself or his family, and fear of the scorn of majority
opinion. 7 9 Walter Cronkite has stated that the material he obtains in privacy
is given to him on that basis because news sources have learned to trust and
confide in him without fear of exposure.8 0 Senator Alan Cranston of California testified in Senate hearings that "informants who fear for their jobsand sometimes for their lives - rarely divulge incriminating information unless
they feel sure that their identity will be kept secret."'' Once the newsman is
subpoenaed and has given testimony, his effectiveness as a reporter is diminished. 2 In a survey of opinion in thirty-one countries the International Press

176. Id.
177. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 730 n.8 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
178. See Blasi, supra note 172, at 245-46.
179. Although 20% of the Florida journalists who responded to a survey (see Appendix
B) felt sources are not affected by the lack of a privilege, 60% felt that for a variety of
compelling personal reasons-fear of prosecution, loss of employment, or social censureconfidential sources are "clamming up." In Professor Blasi's study, conducted before the
Caldwell case was considered by the Supreme Court, the following question was asked: "In
the last eighteen months, has your coverage of any story been adversely affected by the possibility that you might be subpoenaed?" Of 887 newsmen answering, 8% said "Yes," 10.9%
said "I'm not sure," and 81.1% said "No." See Blasi, supra note 172, at 270. Professor Blasi
concludes from these statistics and others compiled in his study that "the adverse impact of
the subpoena threat has been primarily in 'poisoning the atmosphere' so as to make insightful, interpretive reporting more difficult rather than in causing sources to 'dry up'
completely." Id. at 284. Blasi points out, however, that "newsmen fear that an outright rejection by the Supreme Court of any sort of newsman's privilege would 'poison the atmosphere' considerably and thus they regard the symbolic aspect of the current constitutional
litigation to be of the utmost importance." Id. That outright rejection is now a reality.
180. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 9.
181. Id. at 48.
182. Note, The Protection of Confidences: A Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 1971 L. &
Soc. ORDER 385, 387-90. The affidavit of Min S. Yee, accompanying Brief for Newsweek as
amicus curiae, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970), illustrates how a
reporter can lose the trust of sources by responding to subpoenas and giving testimony. After
giving testimony at the Spock trial in which he disclosed information obtained in his
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Institute found that 67.4 per cent of the journalists questioned felt confidential
sources would "dry up" if newsmen betrayed pledges of secrecy.183 Mr. Justice
Stewart in his dissent in Caldwell argued that "[f]amiliarity with the people
and circumstances involved in the myriad background activities that result
in the final product called 'news' is vital to complete and reasonable journalism, unless the press is to be a captive mouthpiece of 'newsmakers.' "184 This
familiarity will exist only if the newsman is able to protect his confidential
news sources.

The journalist-source relationship is, in the opinion of a majority of the
public, one that ought to be sedulously cultivated. In a 1972 Gallup Poll the
18 5
American people were asked to respond to the following question:
Suppose a newspaper reporter obtains information for a news article he
is writing from a person who asks that his name be withheld. Do you
think that the reporter should or should not be required to reveal the
name of this man if he is taken to court to testify about the information
in his news article?
While 34 per cent of the people felt he "should," 54 per cent said he "should
not." A 32-year-old postman said forcing the journalist to reveal his sources
was an invasion of privacy and a breach of confidence,1 6 An elderly man said:
"I don't like the 'big brother' approach of requiring someone to reveal his
sources - how's the newspaper reporter going to get information if he doesn't
protect his sources?"' 8 7 Anonymity has been recognized by the Supreme Court
to serve "most constructive purposes" when information dissemination is
undertaken. s88 Newspapers, leaflets, and pamphlets of the Revolutionary War
period, such as Common Sense by Thomas Paine, 89 were frequently printed
without attribution. 90 The Federalist Papers were published under a fictitious
name.'19 In addition, the right to send anonymous information in the mail has

been recognized. 9 2 An informed public is the "most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment";9 3 and in light of recent events - the "Watergate"
burglary and coverup, the Pentagon Papers affair, the Cambodia bombing

newsgathering capacity, this reporter found that formerly responsive sources in such groups
as the "Red Guards" and the Venceremos Brigade would refuse to talk with him.
183. See Note, supra note 182, at 387-88 n.7.
184. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 729 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
185.

Gallup, Public Backs Press in Debate Over Revealing Confidential Sources, 1972
18 (Rep. No. 90, December).

THE GALLuP OPINION INDEX

186. Id. at 19.
187. Id.
188. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).

189. "Who the author of this production is, is wholly unnecessary to the public, as the
object for attention is the doctrine itself, not the man." T. Paine, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 3, 4 (N. Adkins ed. 1953).
190. Talley v. California, 362 US. 60, 64-65 (1960).
191. Id. at 65.
192. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 US. 301 (1965).
193. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 US. 233, 250 (1936).
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incidents, the Russian wheat deal, the settlement in the Government's case
against International Telephone and Telegraph, My Lai, and the Spiro T.
Agnew bribery, conspiracy, and tax evasion case 194 - it seems certain the com-

munity realizes how vital anonymity in the journalist-source relationship is to
the flow of information.
Concerning the fourth policy consideration, where the injury to the
journalist-source relationship must be weighed against the benefit to be gained
by the government and private litigants from disclosure of confidential sources,
there is the greatest level of disagreement. Opponents of the newsman-source
privilege argue its recognition by the courts or legislative bodies would hinder
the search for truth - that criminal investigation would be rendered less
thorough. 9 5 In addition, it has been declared that estimates of the inhibiting
effect of the subpoena power on the relationship of the newsman and his
sources are "widely divergent and to a great extent speculative."' 196
It should first be pointed out that government officials and other opponents of this privilege have presented little evidence to support their assertions that the investigative processes would in fact be seriously damaged.
Rather, the evidence tends to support the contrary conclusion. In 1973 the
Michigan Legislature considered an amendment to its newsman-source "shield"
law, which would extend its coverage from grand jury proceedings to civil and
criminal trials and legislative inquiries. The attorney general of Michigan,
Frank J. Kelley, although acknowledging that some relevant evidence would
be kept from public authorities, supported the amendment.19 7 In his opinion,
"the benefits to be derived from the enactment" of such a proposal "far outweigh" the potential deterimental effect. 98 Similarly, the office of New Mexico's attorney general, responding to an inquiry from this author, stated that
while the New Mexico newsman-source privilege statute "might" interfere
with criminal investigation and the resolution of civil disputes, the statute had
never precipitated a miscarriage of justice' 9 In fact, New Mexico journalists

194. Confidential sources played a major part in the breaking of these stories. James
Reston was quoted in Senate hearings as having commented in one of his columns: "Under
the new Court orders, even officials who want to talk about the Watergate case or secret

campaign funds or General Lavelle's private air war in Vietnam or milk and wheat deals
have to recognize now that if they give information to a reporter, no matter how reliable
the reporter, he may be hailed into court and offered the choice of disclosing his sources or

going to jail." 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 32.
195. See United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
196.

Id. at 693-94.

197. Letter from Michigan Attorney General Frank J. Kelley to Bill Shuford, Jr., Aug.
17, 1973, on file with the University of Florida Law Review.
198. Id.
199. Letter from the office of the New Mexico attorney general to Bill Shuford, Jr., July
6, 1973, on file with the University of Florida Law Review. A contrary position has been
taken by the chief criminal deputy in the Nevada attorney general's office. Herbert F.
Ahlswede believes there is no justification for a journalist-source privilege- that it has led
to miscarriages of justice, is "subject to great abuse," and "impairs effective law enforcement
criminal investigation." Letter from Nevada's chief criminal deputy, Herbert F. Ahlswede, to
Bill Shuford, Jr., Aug. 16, 1973, on file with the University of FloridaLaw Review.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss3/3

20

Shuford: Newsman-Source Privilege: A Foundation in Policy for Recognition
NEWSMAN-SOURCE

PRIVILEGE

"seldom" are forced to invoke the privilege because they are not frequently
called by state attorneys to testify.200 Other prosecutors in states with "shield"
laws have asserted that recognition of this privilege actually aids law enforcement - that prior to the current barrage of subpoenas there was a "great deal
of cooperation among reporters and law enforcement authorities," 20 1 fostered
by newsman-source privilege statutes. Nor would a testimonial privilege mean
that the government could not profit from the work of the media. Information
obtained from confidential sources would be available to investigators by virtue
of publication. Robert Fischer, New York's special prosecutor of organized
crime, states that he depends heavily on published revelations of newsmen for
leads. 202 It should be noted that if sources are deterred from communicating
with journalists by the lack of privilege protection, the investigator may be in
a less advantageous position than he would have been were there a newsmansource privilege. If sources do not communicate with journalists, government
officials will not have even published news reports before them. 203
The extent of the injury to the press-source relationship, previously discussed, cannot be calculated with scientific precision.2 04 Surveys of reporters
on this topic provide only individual opinion and "must be viewed in the
light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees." 205 Yet, it must be
admitted that consistent survey results do yield some credible facts when considered along with reliable accounts of recent events. 06 The conclusion is
easily reached that some formerly generous news sources are no longer available and that some journalists are not engaging in investigative reporting with
the enthusiasm of the past, having succumbed to the threat of subpoena and
contempt citations. 207
Other Considerations
Those who oppose the recognition of a newsman-source privilege argue
that the individuals who assert the traditional statutory or common law privileges are more carefully screened or selected by authorities than are news
media personnel. 208 One might ask what legal screening procedures in fact
accompany the recognition of an individual as a priest or as a husband or
wife, but, regardless of this, the screening argument does not seem relevant to
the issue. The recognized privileges are not conferred because of any governmental screening, but because society has determined the relationships are so

200.
201.

See New Mexico Letter, supra note 199.
1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 51, 138.

202. Id. at 159
203. Id. at 194-95.
204. United States v. CaldweU, 408 U.S. 665, 733 (1972).
205. Id. at 694.
206. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.

207. See text accompanying notes 9-24 supra.
208. See D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the 4xe; Protevtiota of Confidential Sources of
Information, 6 HARV. J. LEGIs. 307, 311 (1969),
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vital to justice, family harmony, health, and religion that they are to be preserved even at the expense of suppressing evidence. 20 9
Proponents of a statutory newsman-source privilege face the argument that0
21
a bill, capable of effective application, cannot be adequately constructed.
One commentator has contended this argument is directed "more toward the
inexperience of the legislatures in dealing with the problem which results in
poor draftsmanship than with any inherent weakness in the concept." 211
Congress and state legislatures can look to the eighteen states that have enacted
"shield" laws,212 avoid their mistakes, and adopt their successes. In addition,
a model "shield" act has been circulated throughout the United States for the
past several years by Sigma Delta Chi. 213 This act could be studied and
modified to meet the particular requirements of any legislative body.
The equal protection clause would be violated, it has been said, by the
grant of a newsman-source privilege. 214 This was the conclusion of an Oregon
court in 1967, which decided "it would be difficult to rationalize a rule that
would create special constitutional rights for those possessing credentials as
news gathers which would not conflict with the equal privileges and equal
protection concepts also found in the Constitution." 2 5 In the opinion of many
journalists no special constitutional right need be fashioned, the first amendment serving as adequate authority for a "shield" law.216 Furthermore, since
there is a rational basis for the granting of privileged status to the journalistsource relationship- insuring unimpeded gathering of news- the equal protection clause would not be violated.217
Besides its obvious foundation in policy, other compelling reasons support
the grant of a newsman-source privilege. The journalist points out that seldom
is the information in his possession valuable or relevant to the cause for which
he is subpoenaed. 28 Nevertheless, some courts have stated he must disclose
even irrelevant matter (if likely to lead to admissible evidence) when giving
testimony to public authorities. 21 9 This, the newsman contends, leads to the
amalgamation of government and press, with the press as an "investigatory arm

209. Id.

210. N.Y. Times, March 18, 1959, at 75, col. 3.
211. D'Alemberte, supra note 66, at 324-25.
212. See notes 101-106 supra.
213. See Appendix C.
214. State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 249-50, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (1967), cert denied, 392
U.S. 905 (1968).
215. Id.
216. Eighty-two per cent of the journalists responding to this author's Florida survey
thought the first amendment confers a privilege on the news-source relationship. See Appendix B.
217. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
218. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 193.
219. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416, 417 (D. Mass. 1957);
In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 335, 367 P.2d 472, 483 (1961). Contra, Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99
F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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of the government, 220 undertaking the duties of the police agencies.2 21 This
tendency of government officials to engage in "fishing expeditions" through the
use of the subpoena power is costly from the press's perspective - costly in
manpower, time, and attorneys' fees.222 Anthony G. Amsterdam, professor of
law at Stanford University, feels the complicated legal machinery mounted to
enforce a subpoena against a newsman yields "nothing" of evidentiary value.223
Testifying in Senate hearings, Amsterdam said: "These exercises in futility
would be hilariously funny if they were not both expensive and deeply tragic;
expensive in their waste of newsman's, prosecutors', lawyers', and the courts'
time; deeply tragic because reporters' professional lives and the valued right
of the public to be informed through a free press are being senselessly crippled
224
for no conceivable purpose."
CONCLUSION

Without question, the need for a journalist-source privilege in these com22 6
plex times225 is critical:
As private and public aggregations of power burgeon in size and the
pressures for conformity necessarily mount, there is obviously a continuing need for an independent press to disseminate a robust variety
of information and opinion through reportage, investigation and
criticism, if we are to preserve our constitutional tradition of maximizing freedom of choice by encouraging diversity of expression.
The media cannot serve their vital role as disseminators of information and
investigators without the assistance of confidential sources. Confidentiality is
a necessary tool for investigative reporters, "who expose corruption among
public officials, who explain and criticize public policy, who illuminate the
activities and power of criminal elements, who explore the continued need for
prosecution of crimes without victims, who explain counterculture and dissident groups to the rest of society." 227 In a nationwide survey of seventy-four
newspapers, the newsmen of forty-two agreed that confidential sources are more
228
important today than in years past.
220.

Note, The Protection of Confidences: A Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 1971 L. &

Soc. ORDER 385, 386.
221. Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, 1973 Hearings,supranote 2, at 13-14.
222. See 1973 Hearings,supra note 2,at 190; Note, supra note 220, at 391.
223. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 193.
224. Id.
225. "[The administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities
for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the
fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes
the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities." Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931).
226. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (disserlting opinion).
227. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 125.
228. See Note, supra note 220, at 386, 407 n.97;
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To the complexity of the times is added the media's current distrust of
government. Newsmen are generally disillusioned with the processes of government - an outgrowth of the Vietnam War, collapse of civil rights and poverty
efforts, various governmental attempts to suppress dissent, government investigation of the private affairs of reporters, impersonation of reporters by undercover agents, and 229
manipulation of public opinion by using the press as a
"conduit for lies."

One Florida journalist quite caustically reveals the color

of this disillusionment, stating: "No group of people have caused Richard
Nixon more problems than the press - deservedly so. It is quite apparent
230
Richard Nixon was leading this country towards 1984 eleven years early."
The government has countered editorials and the extensive media coverage of
misconduct of public officials with criticisms of its own and with subpoena
and censorship threats.23 1 While future shifts in political power may ease
tensions, the current state of relations is not conducive to cooperation between
the press and government. The battle over recognition of the privileged relationship of newsman-source will certainly continue.
Due recognition has been given to the important role the press plays in
American government and society. Self-government requires a "vigorous,
robust press," which can develop and follow-up confidential leads.2332 While
some criticize the performance of the media, 233 others, such as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, commend journalists for the job they do:234
[N]ewspapers are today the principal watchdogs and protectors of
honest, as well as good, Government. They are, more than anyone else,
the principal guardians of the general welfare of the Community and,
with few exceptions, they serve their city, State or Nation with high
principles, zeal and fearlessness.

229. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 254-55
(1971).
230. Letter from Glenn H. Laney, Jr., publisher of The Belle Glade Herald, to Bill
Shuford, Jr., July 26, 1973, on file with the University of FloridaLaw Review.
231. "To be sure, the press feels threatened and intimidated by a hostile administration. . . . Members of this administration have publicly castigated and threatened press
and broadcast media. Proposals have been made to set up standards for the renewal of
broadcast licenses which are little more than transparent attempts to censor unfavorable
comment. Funds for public broadcasting have been vetoed and public affairs programing,
sometimes critical of the administration, has been curtailed ...
"[T]here was an unusual rash of subpenas issued against the news media." Statement of
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 5.
232. 1973 Hearings,supra note 2, at 47.
233. "Too frequently this freedom takes the form of what the media wishes the public
to hear or read or see (hence, 'to know') and when, in what manner and as to only what
matters it wishes the public to 'know.' Slanting of news, distortions, half truths, bald untruths, nondisclosures, psychologically-screened versions all appear to be an aspect of this
claimed 'freedom.'" Enwall, Point-Counterpoint: Professors Debate Journalistic Privilege,
9 U. Fla. L. Center News, spring 1973, at 4.
234. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963).
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The free press, so vital to the democratic form of government, requires a
newsman-source privilege in order to be effective. In the Caldwell opinion the
Supreme Court said Congress and the state legislatures have the freedom to
determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable, 235 thus indicating that the legislatures should determine whether policy
supports the privilege. No state has, however, acted favorably on a privilege
statute for journalists since the Caldwell decision. 23 6 Additionally, while some
well-drafted federal legislation, such as Senator Cranston's bill,23 7 has been
before the Congress, 238 action on any proposal is not likely in the near future. 39 Formidable opposition to any legislation on this issue has arisen within
the journalism profession, newsmen fearing any legislation might be a precursor to licensing of the press or other regulation. 240 Some journalists are
insistent that the first amendment grants newsmen and their sources a privilege
and are willing to face "years of litigation, uncertainty and possible jail
sentences" to see the privilege declared. 41 Therefore, legislative action in the
near future does not appear likely.
The Supreme Court should reverse itself and, with the high courts of the
states, grant newsmen an unqualified constitutional or common law right to
protect sources. Although first amendment arguments have been rejected in
criminal cases, a foundation in policy supports the recognition of the newsmansource privilege at common law. The privilege should apply across the board
to civil24 2 and criminal cases, and in grand jury, judicial, and legislative proceedings. The public without a doubt will suffer most from the lack of a
newsman-source privilege. Indispensable information about controversial and
sensitive activities of government officials and private individuals in whom the
people repose their trust will be lost. As sources "dry up," conflicts of interest,
crimes, and misconduct will go undisclosed. Reason demands that the privilege
be granted. Yet, the Supreme Court in Caldwell felt there was no constitutional basis for a newsman-source privilege. Perhaps, to paraphrase a statement made by Thomas Paine in Common Sense, time will make more converts than reason, 243 as journalists are imprisoned and the lips of confidential
sources are sealed by fear.
BILL SHUFORD, JR.
235. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
236. See text accompanying notes 111-112 supra.

237. See Appendix A. This bill would provide newsmen with an absolute privilege to
protect confidential sources and information, and would apply on state and federal levels
to the activity of any governmental authority.
238. E.g., S. 36, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 451,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 637, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 750, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 870, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
239. 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2356 (Sept. 1, 1973).
240. Id.; Letter from Waldo Proffit, Jr., editorial director of the Sarasota Herald-Tribune,
to Bill Shuford, Jr., July 20, 1973, on file with the University of Florida Law Review.

241. See Proffit Letter, supra note 240.
242. See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
243. T. Paine, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE
(N. Adkins ed. 1953).
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APPENDIX A
S. 158, 93D CONCRESS, IST SESSION (1973)
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the 'Free Flow of Information
Act.'
FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSE
"SEC. 2. The Congress finds and declares that "(1) the purpose of this Act is to preserve the free flow of news to the public through
the news media;
"(2) a public fully informed about events, situations, or ideas of public concern or public
interest or which affect the public welfare is essential to the principles as well as the effective operation of a democracy;
"(3) the public is dependent for such news on the news media;
"(4) those in the news media who regularly gather, write, or edit news for the public or
disseminate news to the public must be encouraged to gather, write, edit, or disseminate news
vigorously so that the public can be fully informed;
"(5) such persons can perform these vital functions only in a free and unfettered atmosphere
"(6) such persons must not be inhibited, directly or indirectly, in the performance of such
functions by governmental restraint or sanction imposed by governmental process;
"(7) compelling such persons to present testimony or produce material or information
which would reveal or impair source or reveal the content of any published or unpublished
information in their possession dries up confidential and other news sources and serves to
erode the public concept of the press and other news media as independent of governmental
investigative, prosecutorial, or adjudicative processes and functions and thereby inhibits the
free flow of news to the public necessary to keep the public fully informed;
"(8) there is an urgent need to provide effective measures to halt and prevent this inhibition in order to preserve a fully informed public;
"(9) the practice of the news media is to monitor and report across State boundaries those
events, situations, or ideas originally reported locally in one State which may be of concern
or interest to or affect the welfare of residents of another State;
"(10) the free flow of news to the public through the news media, whether or not such
news was originally published in more than one State, affects interstate commerce;
"(11) this Act is necessary to implement the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 8 thereof by preserving the free flow of
news to the public, the historic function of the freedom of the press.
EXEMPTION
"SEC. 3. No person shall be compelled pursuant to subpena or other legal process issued
under the authority of the United States or of any State to give any testimony or to produce
any document, paper, recording, film, object, or thing that would "(1) reveal or impair any sources or source relations, associations, or information received,
developed, or maintained by a newsman in the course of gathering, compiling, composing,
reviewing, editing, publishing, or disseminating news through any news medium; or
"(2) reveal the content of any published or unpublished information received, developed,
or maintained by a newsman in the course of gathering, compiling, composing, reviewing.
editing, publishing, or disseminating news through any news medium.
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PRESUBPENA STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
"SEC. 4. (a) No suhpena or other legal process to compel the testimony of a newsman or
the production of any document, paper, recording, film, object, or thing by a newsman shall
be issued under the authority of the United States or of any State, except upon a finding
that "(1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the newsman has information which is
(A) not within the exemption set forth in section 3 of this Act, and (B) material to a
particular investigation or controversy within the jurisdiction of the issuing person or body;
"(2) there is a factual basis for the investigation or for the claim of the party to the
controversy to which the newsman's information relates; and
"(3) the same or equivalent information is not available to the issuing person or body
from any source other than a newsman.
"(b) A finding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be made "(1) in the case of a court, grand jury, or any officer empowered to institute or bind over
upon criminal charges, by a judge of the court;
"(2) in the case of a legislative body, committee, or subcommittee, by the cognizant body,
committee, or subcommittee;
"(3) in the case of an executive department or agency, by the chief officer of the department or agency; and
"(4) in the case of an independent commission, board, or agency, by the commission,
board, or agency.
"(c) A finding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be made on the record
after hearing. Adequate notice of the hearing and opportunity to be heard shall be given
to the newsman.
"(d) An order of a court issuing or refusing to issue a subpena or other legal process
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be an appealable order and shall be stayed
by the court for a reasonable time to permit appellate review.
"(e) A finding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section made by a body, agency, or other
entity described in clause (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) of this section shall be subject
to judicial review, and the issuance of the subpena or other legal process shall be stayed by

the issuing body, agency, or other entity for a reasonable time to permit judicial review.
SPECIAL LIMITATIONS

"SEC. 5. (a) A finding under section 4 of this Act shall not in any way affect the right
of a newsman to a de novo determination of rights under section 3 of this Act.
"(b) If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of the invalidated provision
to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected

thereby."
APPENDIX B
SURVEY RESULTS'

This survey was conducted among thirty-two general circulation newspapers in Florida.

Journalists were requested to respond to thirteen questions concerning the newsman-source
issue. Responses were received from fifteen newsmen during the summer of 1973. Answers
to several questions will not total fifteen, incomplete questionnaires having been received
from some.

*Compilation of the survey material is on file with the University of Florida Law Review.
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Nine said Florida journalists need the protection of a journalist-source privilege, while
six believed no privilege was needed.
Nine newsmen said sources need the protection of confidentiality; six thought they did not.
According to four journalists, sources become unavailable if confidentiality cannot be
pledged. Three said sources face prosecution, loss of employment, and social censure if their
identity cannot be concealed. Three believed sources were not affected by the lack of a
privilege.
Of those favoring a newsman-source privilege, five advocate an absolute privilege and
four support a qualified privilege.
Six stated that in a "few" situations "the interests of justice, national security, or efficient government would compel disclosure of a privileged source" or confidential information. Two said there were "many" situations in which the need for disclosure would be
compelling. Six insisted that no circumstances would justify an infringement on the journalistsource confidence.
Nine said a "shield" for sources would not interfere with criminal investigation, resolution of civil disputes, and lawmaking; four said it would.
Although two newsmen said they did not use confidential sources, five stated they were
relied upon frequently and six said they were used on several occasions.
If subpoenaed to appear before a governmental authority, eleven journalists said they
would go to jail rather than reveal the identity of sources. One was undecided and another
said he would not go to jail to protect a source.
Two of fifteen journalists had been subpoenaed to give testimony about confidential
sources or information. Neither was held in contempt for a refusal to answer a question.
While ten felt the first amendment was sufficient authority for recognition of this privilege, two said it was not.
Nine said that in covering government the "need" for a privilege was compelling. Confidentiality was also said to be important in the coverage of public affairs, social problems,
and crime.
Two journalists stated the need for a newsman-source privilege was more compelling
than the need for the privileged relationships of attorney-client, husband-wife, physicianpatient, and priest-penitent. Five said the need was the same and seven said there was less
justification for recognition of the "shield" for sources.
Four newsmen cited their Code of Ethics and management or editorial policy of their
papers in support of claimed privilege.
APPENDIX C
MODEL "SHIELD" LAW

By a committee of Sigma Delta Chi
No person shall be required in any proceeding or hearing to disclose any information or
the source of any information procured or obtained by him while he was (a) engaged in
gathering, writing, photographing, or editing news and (b) employed by or acting for any
organization engaged in publishing or broadcasting news, unless the body proposing to
require disclosure of such information or source shall have first obtained a final order of a
court, made after a hearing, and expressly finding:
(I) the existence of probable cause to believe that the witness or his sources has evidence
that is relevant and material to an issue properly pending before such body, and
(2) disclosure by such person is the only method by which such evidence, or evidence of
similar effect, can be obtained; and
(3) the failure of disclosure of such evidence will cause a miscarriage of justice.
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